FROM DALLAS TO GAZA: HOW JFK’S ASSASSINATION WAS
GOOD FOR ZIONIST ISRAEL
Rick Sterling
Issues
WINTER 2024
President John F. Kennedy was assassinated sixty years ago. If he had lived and
won a second term, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would have evolved
differently. Possibly the path toward Israeli apartheid and genocide in Gaza
could have been avoided.
In his short time in office, Kennedy changed U.S. foreign policy in significant
ways. As documented in the book “JFK and the Unspeakable: Why he died and why it
still matters,” JFK resisted the CIA and military industrial complex in the
policies he set regarding the Third World and Soviet Union. The Vietnam War, the
overthrow of President Sukarno and murder of hundreds of thousands of
Indonesians, and continued hostility to Cuba and the Soviet Union would not have
happened had Kennedy lived and won a second term.
Less well known, Kennedy’s policies also challenged and opposed the military and
political ambitions of Zionist Israel. At the time, Israel had only existed for
thirteen years. It was still evolving, and the course was not totally set. There
was significant international resolve to find a compromise solution regarding
Palestinian refugees from the 1948 Nakba. When Israel attacked Egypt and seized
the Sinai Peninsula in 1956, the Eisenhower administration demanded Israel
withdraw from the captured territory. They complied.
Racism and Discrimination in Israel
At this time, in the early 1960’s, prominent Jewish voices criticized the racism
and discrimination of the Israeli government. Israelis like Martin Buber assailed
Ben-Gurion and noted that, “At the inception of the state, complete equality with
the Jewish citizens was promised to the Arab population.” Many influential
Israelis realized their long-term security and well-being depended on finding a
just settlement with the indigenous Palestinian population.
In the United States, the Jewish community was divided, and many were anti-
Zionist. The American Council for Judaism was influential and anti-nationalist.
The racist and militaristic character of Israel was not yet set in stone. Nor was
American Jewish support for Israel. When Menachem Begin came to the United States
in 1948, he was denounced by prominent Jewish leaders, including Albert Einstein.
They said Begin, who later became Israeli Prime Minister, was a “terrorist” who
preached “an admixture of ultra-nationalism, religious mysticism and racial
superiority.” Many American Jews had mixed feelings and did not identify with
Israel. Others supported Israel but on the basis of there being peace with the
indigenous Palestinians.
There are four key areas where the Kennedy policy was substantially different
from what followed after his death.
Kennedy was Not Biased in favor of Israel
The Kennedy administration sought good relations with both Israel and the Arab
nations. Kennedy aimed to extend U.S. influence throughout the Middle East,
including with nations friendly with the Soviet Union and at odds with NATO
partners.
JFK personally supported Arab and African nationalism. As a senator in 1957, he
criticized the Eisenhower administration for supporting and sending weapons to
France in their war against the Algerian independence movement. In a 9,000-word
presentation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he criticized “Western
imperialism” and called for the U.S. to support Algerian independence. Algerian
President Ben Bella, who France had tried to assassinate and considered far too
radical by many in NATO, was given a huge and impressive welcome to the White
House.
Kennedy changed the previous frosty relations with the United Arab Republic
(Egypt and Syria) led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. For the first time, the U.S.
approved loans to them. Kennedy wrote respectful letters to the Arab presidents
before he welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to Washington. The Arab
leaders could see the difference and responded with appreciation. Those who claim
there was no difference with Kennedy ignore the fact that Egypt’s Nasser,
Algeria’s Ben Bella, and other nationalist leaders saw a big difference.
Friendship For All Middle Eastern People
In 1960, when Kennedy was campaigning for the presidency, he spoke at the Zionist
Organization of America Convention. He made complimentary remarks about Israel
but also expressed the need for friendship with all the people of the Middle
East. He said the U.S. should “act promptly and decisively against any nation in
the Middle East which attacks its neighbor” and “The Middle East needs water, not
war; tractors, not tanks; bread, not bombs.”
Kennedy frankly told the Zionists, “I cannot believe that Israel has any real
desire to remain indefinitely a garrison state surrounded by fear and hate.” By
maintaining objectivity and neutrality on the Israeli Arab conflict, Kennedy
wanted to steer the Jewish Zionists away from the racist, militaristic, and
ultra-nationalistic impulses which have led to where we are today.
Kennedy Wanted the Zionist Lobby to Follow the Rules
The second difference in Kennedy’s policy is regarding Zionist lobbying on behalf
of Israel. Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), organizations that
promote or lobby on behalf of a foreign government are required to register and
account for their finances and activities. Under Attorney General Robert Kennedy,
the Department of Justice (DOJ) instructed the American Zionist Council (AZC) to
register as agents of a foreign country. AZC is the parent organization of the
American Israel Public Affairs Council (AIPAC).
As documented in detail here, on 21 November 1962, the Assistant Attorney General
wrote to them that “the receipt of such funds from the American sections of the
Jewish Agency for Israel constitutes the (American Zionist) Council an agent of a
foreign principal…. the Council’s registration is requested.”
The emergence of Israeli political influence was also scrutinized in the Senate.
Under Senator J. William Fulbright, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held
hearings in May and August 1963. They revealed that tax free donations to the
United Jewish Appeal, supposedly for humanitarian relief in Israel, were being
channeled back to the U.S. where the money was used for lobbying and Israeli
public relations.
Registration As a Foreign Agent
Attorneys for AZC stalled for time. On August 16, 1963, a Department of Justice
(DOJ) analyst reviewed the case and concluded, “The Department should insist on
the immediate registration of the American Zionist Council under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act.”
On October 11 the DOJ demanded that AZC register and “Department expects a
response from you within 72 hours.”
On October 17, a DOJ memorandum reports that attorneys for AZC pleaded for not
being required to register as foreign agents. They offered to provide the
required financial disclosures but that registering as a foreign agent “would be
so publicized by the American Council for Judaism that it would eventually
destroy the Zionist movement.” As indicated in this discussion, political
Zionism was not yet dominant in the American Jewish community and was actively
opposed by the American Council for Judaism and other Jewish groups.
Kennedy Supported Palestinian Rights
A third difference is regarding Palestinian rights. Although he was only 44 when
he became president, Kennedy had more international experience than most U.S.
presidents. In 1939 he spent two weeks in Palestine. In a lengthy letter to his
father, he described the situation and difficulties. He wrote, “The sympathy of
the people on the spot seems to be with the Arabs. This is not only because the
Jews have had, at least some of their leaders, an unfortunately arrogant,
uncompromising attitude, but they feel that after all, the country has been
Arabic for the last few hundred years …. Palestine was hardly Britain’s to give
away.”
In comments that are still true, Kennedy remarks how the Jewish residents are
divided between “strongly Orthodox Jewish group, unwilling to make any
compromise” and a “liberal Jewish element composed of the younger group who fear
these reactionaries”. His analysis is sympathetic to both Jewish and Arab
peoples and addresses the difficulty but necessity to find a compromise solution.
In the early 1960’s, the U.S. State Department was not locked in to a biased
acceptance or approval of Israeli policies. The U.S. supported U.N. Resolution
194 resolving (in paragraph 11) that “refugees wishing to return to their homes
and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the
earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property
of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which,
under principles of international law or equity, should be made good by the
Governments or authorities responsible.” This has become known as the “right of
return”.
Discord Between Washington and Tel Aviv
On November 21, 1963, the day before Kennedy’s assassination, the New York Times
has two news stories which exemplify the discord between Washington and Tel Aviv.
A report from the United Nations is titled “Israel Dissents as U.N. Group Backs
U.S. on Arab Refugees”. It begins, “A United States resolution calling for
continued efforts to resolve the predicament of the Palestinian Arab refugees was
approved tonight 83 to 1… Israel cast the single negative vote…. The issue
centers on a 1948 resolution whose key section, paragraph 11, concerns the future
of the Arabs who were displaced from their homes by the Palestine conflict. They
have been living in the lands bordering Israel …. The revised United States text
calls on the Palestine Conciliation Commission to ‘continue its efforts for the
implementation of Paragraph 11’.”
The second New York Times story is titled “U.S. Stand Angers Israel”. It reports
from Jerusalem that “Premier Levi Eshkol expressed extreme distaste today for the
United States’ position in the Palestine refugee debate…. Israel’s anger was
conveyed ‘in the strongest terms’ to the U.S. Ambassador …. The Israeli
Government is upset about the American resolution before the U.N. Political
Committee and by American maneuvers over the issue.” Israel was angered and
objecting because the Kennedy administration was trying to resolve the
Palestinian refugee situation including the right of return.
Kennedy tried to stop the Israeli nuclear weapons program
The fourth and biggest contention between Kennedy and the Israeli leadership was
regarding their developing nuclear weapons. This issue was kept so secret that
crucial documents and letters have only been released in recent years.
President Kennedy was a strong advocate for stopping nuclear proliferation.
After the 1962 Cuba missile crisis, he realized how easy it would be to
intentionally or accidentally trigger a catastrophic nuclear war. If nuclear
weapons were allowed to spread to more countries, the risks of global catastrophe
would be all the greater. It was also predicted that if Israel acquired nuclear
weapons capability, they would become more aggressive and less likely to reach a
compromise agreement regarding Palestinian refugees.
When intelligence indicated that Israel might be trying to build a nuclear weapon
at Dimona in 1962, Kennedy was determined to find out if this was true, and if so
to stop it. This caused an intense diplomatic confrontation between JFK and
Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. The proof of this has recently been
revealed in the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Prime Minister
Ben-Gurion and his successor Levi Eshkol. They are all labeled “Top Secret” or
“Eyes Only”.
It is important to see the sequence and some details to understand how intense
this showdown was. These communications are all from 1963. (Note to reader: skip
ahead to the next section if you become tired of the detail in the following
exchanges.)
In March the U.S. State Department instructed the U.S. Ambassador to inform the
government of Israel (GOI) that for “compelling reasons” the “USG seeks GOI
assent to semi-annual repeat semi-annual visits to Dimona, perhaps May and
November, with full access to all parts and instruments in the facility, by
qualified US scientists.”
On April 19 the State Department instructed the US Ambassador to Israel to
“press” for an “affirmative reply” to the earlier request for semi-annual
inspections of Dimona.
Evading The Issue of Inspections
On April 26, Israeli PM Ben Gurion replied to President Kennedy. He evaded the
issue of nuclear facility inspections and instead expressed his concern regarding
a recent proclamation from Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. He compared Egyptian President
Nasser to Germany’s Hitler.
On May 4 JFK responded to Ben Gurion’s concerns and underscored the U.S.
commitment to Israel and peace in the Middle East. He told the Israeli leader he
is much less worried about an “early Arab attack” than the “successful
development of advanced offensive systems”.
On May 8 a Special National Intelligence Estimate concluded, “Israel intends at
least to put itself in a position to be able to produce a limited number of
weapons” and that “unless deterred by outside pressure [the Israelis] will
attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years.” The analysis
predicted that if Israelis had the bomb, it would “encourage them to be bolder in
their use of the conventional resources both diplomatic and military in their
confrontation with the Arabs.”
On May 10 U.S. State Department sent an “Eyes Only Ambassador” telegram to the
U.S. Ambassador to Israel. The ambassador was instructed to remind the Israeli
leadership that they have previously agreed to the bi-annual inspections. The
telegram also says Israeli concerns about Arab development of a nuclear bomb “are
not valid” because there is nothing comparable to the “advanced Israeli program.”
Israeli Lobby Escalates Tension
The tensions between the Kennedy administration and Tel Aviv caused the Israel
lobby to escalate pressure on the White House. This is revealed in a May 11 TOP
SECRET State Department memo regarding “White House Concern with Arab-Israeli
Matters”. It begins, “In recent weeks, as you are aware, it has become
increasingly clear that the White House is under steadily mounting domestic
political pressure to adopt a foreign policy in the Near East more consonant with
Israeli desires. The Israelis are determined to use the period between now and
the 1964 Presidential election to secure a closer, more public security
relationship with the Unites States, notably through a public security guarantee
and a cooler, more antagonistic relationship between the United States and the
UAR [United Arab Republic].” This is a highly interesting memo showing Israeli
influence in U.S. policy and electoral politics. It further shows Kennedy’s
effort to mitigate this influence while standing firm on the goal to stop nuclear
proliferation.
On May 12, 1963, Ben Gurion wrote another long letter to President Kennedy.
Again, evading the U.S. request, Ben Gurion gives a distorted history including
the claim that Palestinian refugees left Palestine “at the demand of Arab
leaders”. He again compares Nasser to Hitler and suggests the danger of a new
Holocaust. He says, “Mr. President, my people have the right to exist … and this
existence is in danger.”
On May 19 Kennedy responded to Ben Gurion emphasizing the importance he placed on
not allowing the spread of nuclear weapons. “We are concerned with the disturbing
effects on world stability which would accompany the development of a nuclear
weapons capability by Israel.” Kennedy underscores the “deep commitment to the
security of Israel” but says the commitment and support “would be seriously
jeopardized” if the U.S. is unable to obtain reliable information about “Israel’s
efforts in the nuclear field.”
On May 27 Ben Gurion responded to Kennedy saying that the nuclear reactor at
Dimona “will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes”. He counters Kennedy’s
request for bi-annual visits starting in June by suggesting annual visits “such
as have already taken place” starting at the end of the year. The condition is
significant because the previous “visit” to Dimona was restricted in time and
space.
Nuclear Site Inspection
On June 15 Kennedy wrote to Ben Gurion after he had received a scientific
evaluation of the minimum requirements for a nuclear site inspection. After
welcoming Ben Gurion’s assurances that Dimona will only be devoted to peaceful
purposes, Kennedy issued a polite ultimatum. “If Israel’s purposes are to be
clear to world beyond reasonable doubt, I believe the schedule which would best
serve our common purpose would be a visit early this summer, another visit in
June 1964, thereafter at intervals of six months.” He specifies that the “visit”
must include access to all areas and “sufficient time be allotted for thorough
examination.”
On June 16, the U.S. Embassy in Israel reported that Ben Gurion resigned as
Israel’s Prime Minister. This was a huge surprise; the explanation was that it
was for “personal reasons”. It is likely that Ben-Gurion knew the contents of the
forthcoming letter from Washington (received at the embassy the day before). The
impact of his resignation was to stall for time. US Ambassador Barbour suggested
waiting until the “cabinet problem is worked out” before sending JFKs near
ultimatum to the next Prime Minister.
Kennedy did not wait long. On July 4, he wrote to new Israeli Prime Minister Levi
Eshkol. After congratulating Eshkol on becoming new Prime Minister, he goes
straight to the point “concerning American visits to Israel’s nuclear facility at
Dimona.” Kennedy says, “I regret having to add to your burdens to soon after your
assumption of office, but …” He then goes on to request inspections as was
requested in the letter to Ben-Gurion and that “support of Israel could be
seriously jeopardized” if this is not done.
Israel’s Defiance
On July 17, Eshkol wrote to Kennedy that he needed to study the issue more before
responding to Kennedy’s request for visits to Dimona. U.S. Ambassador Barbour
added that Eshkol verbally conveyed that he was “surprised” at Kennedy’s
statement that U.S. commitment to Israel might be jeopardized. Indicating Israeli
defiance, Eshkol told the U.S. Ambassador “Israel would do what it had to do for
its national security and to safeguard its sovereign rights.”
On August 19, Eshkol wrote to Kennedy re-iterating the “peaceful purpose” of
Dimona and ignoring the request for a summer inspection. He proposed the
inspection take place “toward the end of 1963”.
On August 26 Kennedy wrote to Eshkol accepting the visit at year end but
emphasizing it needs to be done “when the reactor’s core is being loaded and
before internal radiation hazards have developed.” Kennedy set these conditions
because they were essential for determining whether the facility could be used
for developing a nuclear weapon.
On September 16, the State Department prepared a Memorandum of Conversation with
a counselor from the British Embassy. There was joint concern but agreement that
Dimona would be visited and inspected “prior to the activation of the reactor.”
After the Assassination of JFK on November 22.
After Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) became president, U.S. Mideast policy changed
significantly. From the start, LBJ told an Israeli diplomat, “You have lost a
very great friend. But you have found a better one.” The Israeli publication
Haaretz says, “Historians generally regard Johnson as the president most
uniformly friendly to Israel.” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs
writes “Lyndon Johnson Was First to Align U.S. Policy with Israel’s Policies” and
“Up to Johnson’s presidency, no administration had been as completely pro-Israel
and anti-Arab as his.”
On the crucial issue of Dimona inspection, the Israelis ignored JFK’s condition
and the reactor went critical on December 26. When the inspection occurred three
weeks later, they could not inspect the areas that had been irradiated. A
handwritten comment on the report says, “We were supposed to see this first!” We
do not know what would have happened it JFK had been in the White House but given
the intensity of his effort, and deep convictions regarding the dangers of
nuclear proliferation, it would not have been ignored as it was under LBJ.
Under LBJ, relations with Egypt deteriorated. The U.S. stopped providing direct
assistance loans and grants to Egypt. The U.S. became increasingly antagonistic
to President Nasser, as desired by the Israel lobby. U.S. support for a
resolution to the Palestinian refugee issue decreased and then stopped.
The Department of Justice efforts to require the American Zionist Council to
register as foreign agents became increasingly weak until they were dropped under
LBJ’s new Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach. The sequence of exchanges
includes:
On December 11, 1963, the AZC attorney wrote to the DOJ saying, “Our client is
not prepared to register as an agent of a foreign government.” Instead, he
proposed to provide “voluntarily” the required financial information.
In January and February 1964, there were more exchange between AZC and the DOJ.
AZC expressed concern because the American Council for Judaism publicly said that
AZC was acting as “propaganda agents for the state of Israel and that the Jewish
Agency was being used as a conduit for funds for the Zionist organization in the
United States.”
In summer 1964 Nicholas Katzenbach becomes Attorney General. Negotiations
continued. DOJ staff noted that AZC was “stalling” and not providing acceptable
information despite the increasingly special and favorable treatment. In spring
of 1965 the DOJ accepted that AZC was NOT required to register as foreign agent.
Their financial information was kept in a unique expandable folder. In November
1967 the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) applied for a federal
tax exemption. The U.S. Treasury Department granted it, backdated to 1953.
Increasingly Aggressive and Uncompromising Zionist Israel
The successful development of nuclear weapons added to Israel’s aggressive
actions and unwillingness to resolve the Palestinian refugee crisis.
With intelligence information provided by Washington, Israel made a surprise
attack on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in June 1967. The “Six Day War” was a crucial
turning point in Middle East history. Israel quickly defeated the unprepared
combined armies. In the West, public perception of Israel changed overnight. The
mythology of Israeli military (and general) superiority was created. Among the
American Jewish population, doubts and concerns about Israel evaporated and
support skyrocketed.
Israeli leaders’ arrogance and deceit is exemplified by the attack on the USS
Liberty during the Six Day War. The communications navy vessel was monitoring the
air waves in the eastern Mediterranean when it was attacked by Israeli aircraft
and boats. Thirty-four US sailors were killed and 172 injured. Amazingly, the
ship managed to stay afloat. The plan was evidently to sink the ship, blame it on
Egypt and consolidate U.S. support and hostility to Egypt and the Soviet Union.
Lyndon Johnson over-ruled the calls for help from the vessel, saying “I will not
have my ally embarrassed.” The deadly incident was covered up for decades.
We do not know for sure what might have happened had JFK not been assassinated.
It is possible that Israel would have been stopped from acquiring the bomb.
Without that, they may not have had the audacity to launch the 1967 attacks on
their neighbors, seizing the Golan, West Bank and Gaza Strip. If the Zionist
lobby had been required to register as foreign agents, their influence would have
been moderated. Perhaps Israel could have found a reasonable accommodation with
Palestinians in one or two states.
Instead, Israel hardened into an apartheid regime, committing increasingly
outrageous massacres. As Kennedy warned in 1960, Israel has become a “garrison
state” surrounded by “hate and fear”. The assassination of John F Kennedy
insured Zionist control of Israel, suffering for Palestinians and permanent
instability. *
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